June 18th 2024 | Jessica Van Tassel
Edited by Yashas Mallikarjun
There is often an assumption that the sole actors wielding control for all aspects of lawmaking and implementation are the country’s lawmakers. It initially appears to make the most sense, as our congressional representatives, senators, and locally elected officials represent the majority voice. Although these politicians do craft and implement many laws, there can be a more intricate process that follows a law’s passing. A process that unveils ways through which unelected bureaucrats and agencies govern this country with their expertise. Something that may create initial unease, as this seems to go against the fundamental ideals of democracy, however upon further consideration, is an indispensable function of our government. It is essential to consider how elected representatives are expected and required to address a very wide spectrum of issues they cannot realistically specialize in. Because of this, it is not uncommon to find ambiguous wording within laws that cannot be enforced by the people expected to maintain the integrity of our laws. As a result, agencies step in and use the law as a guide through which they operate. This practice was solidified in the Supreme Court case Chevron U.S.A., Inc v. Natural resources Defense Council which allows agencies generous autonomy when laws lack specific wording [1]. However, the Supreme Court has accepted a few cases that threaten the forty years of precedent that have been established under the Chevron Doctrine. A ruling overturning the Chevron Doctrine would have significant implications in the functioning and authority of essential government agencies and grant generous power to unelected judges with little expertise and a highly politicized agenda.
In 1984, the Supreme Court established the Chevron Doctrine in the landmark case Chevron U.S.A., Inc v. Natural Resources Defense Council. The origins of this case can be understood following the passing of the Clean Air of 1977 which required states to achieve a certain national air quality standard as established by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) [2]. During the Reagan administration, the EPA revised its interpretation of what constitutes a ‘stationary source’ under the Clean Air Act, adopting a ‘bubble policy.’ This policy allowed entire plants or industrial complexes to be treated as a single ‘bubble’ or stationary source rather than evaluating individual emissions sources separately. This change helped companies obtain operating permits, as it allowed them to make modifications within their facilities without exceeding the total emissions limits for the ‘bubble’. This approach was generally aimed at stimulating growth within businesses in the United States. In response to the EPA’s reinterpretation, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) filed a lawsuit, arguing that the ‘bubble policy’ violated the Clean Air Act’s purpose to reduce individual source emissions of air pollutants. This case eventually reached the Supreme Court who ruled in favor of Chevron U.S.A., the plaintiff arguing in favor of the EPA’s reinterpretation, establishing the Chevron Doctrine [1]. The Supreme Court reasoned that because the Clean Air Act did not explicitly state how “stationary sources” should be defined, and the EPA’s reinterpretation was reasonable; then, given this agency’s specialized expertise in this field, they are better equipped than judges or lawmakers to make detailed decisions on technical issues. These agencies can update their policies more quickly and easily than Congress can change laws, allowing them to adapt to new information or changing conditions. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Chevron because it believed that agencies should have the flexibility to interpret laws in their area of expertise, especially when those laws aren’t clear-cut. This opinion established the Chevron Doctrine which does just that— it allows federal agencies the autonomy to interpret and implement the provisions of ambiguous statutes within their jurisdiction. This doctrine not only affirmed the role of federal agencies in shaping policy, but also recognized their capacity to make nuanced decisions based on their specialized knowledge and expertise. However, under the new, highly conservative Supreme Court reshaped by recent appointments of Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanagh and Amy Coney Barrett, justices have granted certiorari to a series of cases that threaten the overturning of the well-established Chevron Doctrine. Such a ruling would drastically reshape the landscape of administrative authority, potentially curb agencies’ ability to effectively interpret and implement ambiguous statutes, and significantly shift power dynamics between the judiciary, Congress, and regulatory agencies.
Exploring the potential consequences of overturning the Chevron Doctrine reveals ramifications between legal interpretation, administrative autonomy, and broader implications for regulatory governance in the United States. Without Chevron deference, courts would no longer feel bound to defer to agencies’ interpretations of ambiguous statutes. This could lead to judges substituting their interpretations instead of turning to agencies, introducing a concern regarding the injection of personal political biases into legal rulings. Unlike agency officials, who operate under executive oversight and are subject to various checks and balances, judges are largely insulated from direct political repercussions, serving long or even lifetime appointments. This insulation, while designed to preserve judicial independence, could lead to a scenario where unelected judges wield their authority to further personal or political agendas under the guise of statutory interpretation. Such a development would blur the lines between the judiciary’s role in interpreting the law and the executive’s role in implementing policy— a dangerous realignment of power within the federal government. This change could have lasting effects on the future of regulatory governance and policy effectiveness. By shifting the balance of interpretive authority away from agencies and towards the judiciary, the potential for a more politicized, less consistent approach to regulation increases. These effects could be especially detrimental within the realm of public health.
In the present climate characterized by a rampant spread of disinformation and misinformation—particularly evident in the realm of public health during the COVID-19 pandemic—the potential for the judiciary to assume greater control over public health policy poses significant risks. The landscape of public health has become increasingly politicized, making it a risky field to navigate without specialized knowledge. With media outlets often presenting conflicting information, the prospect of judges potentially harboring preconceived notions or lacking an understanding of public health issues while shaping crucial health policies is especially alarming. This concern is not unfounded, considering historical instances where federal agencies, leveraging the Chevron Doctrine, have adeptly navigated ambiguous statutes to implement health policies. For example, the Food and Drug Administration has utilized Chevron deference to regulate tobacco products impacting public health significantly [3]. Similarly, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has, under Chevron’s umbrella, issued guidelines that profoundly affect disease control and prevention strategies [4]. Entrusting public health policy to the judiciary, especially amidst an information crisis, could not only hinder the proactive and informed decision-making required in this field but also jeopardize the well-being and safety of American citizens, for whom these policies are a lifeline.
As we stand at a pivotal moment in the evolution of administrative law, the prospect of overturning the Chevron Doctrine demonstrates the delicate balance between legal interpretations, regulatory autonomy, and a necessity to safeguard public health. The Chevron Doctrine has historically provided a framework that leverages agency expertise to navigate the complexities of governance, particularly in areas where technical understanding and adaptability are crucial. The potential reconfiguration of this balance towards a judiciary-led interpretation, devoid of specialized knowledge, not only threatens the efficiency and consistency of regulatory actions but also risks the foundational principles of public welfare and safety that are critical to the health of our nation. In recognizing the indispensable role of expert-led agency discretion, it becomes clear that preserving the Chevron Doctrine is not merely a matter of legal precedent but a safeguard for the collective well-being of American society.
Sources:
[1] Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837. 1984.
[2] United States, Congress. Clean Air Act. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 1970, http://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-clean-air-act. Accessed 17 June 2024.
[3] Bendicksen, Liam, Kesselheim, Aaron, Ross Daval, Joseph. et al. “FDA and Chevron Deference: A Case Review.” Social Science Research Network, 1 Jan. 2023, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4538500. Accessed 29 Apr. 2024.
[4] Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. “Guidelines and Guidance Library.” CDC, 8 Apr. 2024, https://www.cdc.gov/infectioncontrol/guidelines/index.html. Accessed 17 June 2024.
JHULR 
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